Propositions are again cast as the contents of beliefs and assertions, and propositions have structure which at least roughly corresponds to the structure of sentences. At least, for simple beliefs like that Ramey sings, the proposition has the same subject predicate structure as the sentence. With facts and structured propositions in hand, an attempt may be made to explain the relation of correspondence. Correspondence holds between a proposition and a fact when the proposition and fact have the same structure, and the same constituents at each structural position.
When they correspond, the proposition and fact thus mirror each-other. In our simple example, we might have:. Propositions, though structured like facts, can be true or false. In a false case, like the proposition that Ramey dances, we would find no fact at the bottom of the corresponding diagram. Beliefs are true or false depending on whether the propositions which are believed are. We have sketched this view for simple propositions like the proposition that Ramey sings.
How to extend it to more complex cases, like general propositions or negative propositions, is an issue we will not delve into here. It requires deciding whether there are complex facts, such as general facts or negative facts, or whether there is a more complex relation of correspondence between complex propositions and simple facts. The issue of whether there are such complex facts marks a break between Russell and Wittgenstein and the earlier views which Moore and Russell sketch.
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According to the correspondence theory as sketched here, what is key to truth is a relation between propositions and the world, which obtains when the world contains a fact that is structurally similar to the proposition. Though this is not the theory Moore and Russell held, it weaves together ideas of theirs with a more modern take on structured propositions. We will thus dub it the neo-classical correspondence theory. This theory offers us a paradigm example of a correspondence theory of truth. The leading idea of the correspondence theory is familiar.
It is a form of the older idea that true beliefs show the right kind of resemblance to what is believed. In this theory, it is the way the world provides us with appropriately structured entities that explains truth.
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Our metaphysics thus explains the nature of truth, by providing the entities needed to enter into correspondence relations. For more on the correspondence theory, see David , and the entry on the correspondance theory of truth. Though initially the correspondence theory was seen by its developers as a competitor to the identity theory of truth, it was also understood as opposed to the coherence theory of truth. We will be much briefer with the historical origins of the coherence theory than we were with the correspondence theory.
Like the correspondence theory, versions of the coherence theory can be seen throughout the history of philosophy. See, for instance, Walker for a discussion of its early modern lineage. Like the correspondence theory, it was important in the early 20th century British origins of analytic philosophy. Particularly, the coherence theory of truth is associated with the British idealists to whom Moore and Russell were reacting. Many idealists at that time did indeed hold coherence theories. Let us take as an example Joachim This is the theory that Russell a attacks.
Truth (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Joachim says that:. But a few remarks about his theory will help to give substance to the quoted passage. This is not merely a turn of phrase, but a reflection of his monistic idealism. Individual judgments or beliefs are certainly not the whole complete truth. Such judgments are, according to Joachim, only true to a degree. One aspect of this doctrine is a kind of holism about content, which holds that any individual belief or judgment gets its content only in virtue of being part of a system of judgments. Any real judgment we might make will only be partially true.
We will not attempt that, as it leads us to some of the more formidable aspects of his view, e. As with the correspondence theory, it will be useful to recast the coherence theory in a more modern form, which will abstract away from some of the difficult features of British idealism. As with the correspondence theory, it can be put in a slogan:. To further the contrast with the neo-classical correspondence theory, we may add that a proposition is true if it is the content of a belief in the system, or entailed by a belief in the system.
We may assume, with Joachim, that the condition of coherence will be stronger than consistency. With the idealists generally, we might suppose that features of the believing subject will come into play. This theory is offered as an analysis of the nature of truth, and not simply a test or criterion for truth. It is the way the coherence theory is given in Walker , for instance.
See also Young for a recent defense of a coherence theory.
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Let us take this as our neo-classical version of the coherence theory. The contrast with the correspondence theory of truth is clear. Far from being a matter of whether the world provides a suitable object to mirror a proposition, truth is a matter of how beliefs are related to each-other. The coherence theory of truth enjoys two sorts of motivations.
One is primarily epistemological. Most coherence theorists also hold a coherence theory of knowledge; more specifically, a coherence theory of justification. According to this theory, to be justified is to be part of a coherent system of beliefs.
An argument for this is often based on the claim that only another belief could stand in a justification relation to a belief, allowing nothing but properties of systems of belief, including coherence, to be conditions for justification. Combining this with the thesis that a fully justified belief is true forms an argument for the coherence theory of truth. The steps in this argument may be questioned by a number of contemporary epistemological views.
But the coherence theory also goes hand-in-hand with its own metaphysics as well. The coherence theory is typically associated with idealism. As we have already discussed, forms of it were held by British idealists such as Joachim, and later by Blanshard in America. An idealist should see the last step in the justification argument as quite natural. More generally, an idealist will see little if any room between a system of beliefs and the world it is about, leaving the coherence theory of truth as an extremely natural option.
It is possible to be an idealist without adopting a coherence theory. For instance, many scholars read Bradley as holding a version of the identity theory of truth. See Baldwin for some discussion. However, it is hard to see much of a way to hold the coherence theory of truth without maintaining some form of idealism. Walker argues that every coherence theorist must be an idealist, but not vice-versa. The neo-classical correspondence theory seeks to capture the intuition that truth is a content-to-world relation.
It captures this in the most straightforward way, by asking for an object in the world to pair up with a true proposition. The neo-classical coherence theory, in contrast, insists that truth is not a content-to-world relation at all; rather, it is a content-to-content, or belief-to-belief, relation. The coherence theory requires some metaphysics which can make the world somehow reflect this, and idealism appears to be it. A distant descendant of the neo-classical coherence theory that does not require idealism will be discussed in section 6.
For more on the coherence theory, see Walker and the entry on the coherence theory of truth. A different perspective on truth was offered by the American pragmatists. As with the neo-classical correspondence and coherence theories, the pragmatist theories go with some typical slogans.
For example, Peirce is usually understood as holding the view that:. See, for instance Hartshorne et al. Both Peirce and James are associated with the slogan that:. James e. True beliefs are guaranteed not to conflict with subsequent experience. See Misak for an extended discussion. This marks an important difference between the pragmatist theories and the coherence theory we just considered.
Even so, pragmatist theories also have an affinity with coherence theories, insofar as we expect the end of inquiry to be a coherent system of beliefs. As Haack also notes, James maintains an important verificationist idea: truth is what is verifiable. We will see this idea re-appear in section 4. For more on pragmatist theories of truth, see Misak Modern forms of the classical theories survive.
Many of these modern theories, notably correspondence theories, draw on ideas developed by Tarski. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that his seminal work on truth is very much of a piece with other works in mathematical logic, such as his , and as much as anything this work lays the ground-work for the modern subject of model theory — a branch of mathematical logic, not the metaphysics of truth. In the classical debate on truth at the beginning of the 20th century we considered in section 1, the issue of truth-bearers was of great significance.
Many theories we reviewed took beliefs to be the bearers of truth. In contrast, Tarski and much of the subsequent work on truth takes sentences to be the primary bearers of truth. But whereas much of the classical debate takes the issue of the primary bearers of truth to be a substantial and important metaphysical one, Tarski is quite casual about it.